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How do corporatist and liberal labour markets 
diff er, and what does it mean
for economic policy?* 
Simon Sturn
Abstract
How do labour market institutions aff ect unemployment? Whereas some empirical studies fi nd that mainly such institutions explain un-
employment, others argue that this correlation is not robust. By means of a survey of the literature I provide evidence that one explanation 
for these contradictory results is that labour market institutions aff ect unemployment diff erently within distinct labour market regimes. 
Because of institutional complementarities and a trade-off  between external and internal fl exibility, certain labour market institutions yield 
distinct impacts on unemployment within labour markets characterized by a high degree of corporatism, good labour relations, and high 
internal fl exibility. Th us it is crucial for policymakers to take institutional complementarities into account when reforming the labour mar-
ket.
1.  Introduction 
Until now there exists no empirical consensus explanation on 
the causes of high unemployment. Several econometric stud-
ies investigate this topic, but the results are very ambiguous. 
According to the “standard explanation”, structural unem-
ployment is driven by labour market fl exibility. This view is 
confi rmed by many authors who argue that unemployment 
is primarily the result of rigid labour markets (e.g. OECD, 
1994; Nickell, 1997; IMF, 2003; Nickell et al., 2005; Bassanini 
and Duval, 2006, 2009).
But several researchers object that the empirical support for 
this view is not conclusive. For example, Blanchard and Katz  
(1997: 67) argue that “the crosscountry evidence on the rela-
tion of unemployment to rigidities is less than fully support-
ive.” Fitoussi et al. (2000: 257), referring to the OECD Jobs 
Study series, fi nd that “the institutional reforms in the OECD 
proposal can only be a small part of the story.” Baker et al. 
(2004: 15) consider the impact of labour market institutions 
on unemployment nebulous: “While it is possible to con-
struct multivariate regressions that fi nd signifi cant relation-
ships between various labour market institutions and the un-
employment rate, it is also easy to construct equally plausible 
regressions that do not.” Baccaro and Rei (2007: 563) show 
that “the impact of labor market institutions is, for the most 
part, not robust and that unemployment is mostly increased 
by high real interest rates and independent central banks.” 
Freeman (2007: 19) summarises that “despite considerable 
eﬀ ort, researchers have not pinned down the eﬀ ects, if any, 
of institutions on […] unemployment and employment.” Bell 
and Blanchfl ower (2009: 15f) conclude:
“The orthodox explanation of unemployment that ar-
gues that institutions matt er has been subject to fairly 
extensive econometric testing, and in recent years, the 
validity of the empirical results supporting this view 
has been called into question. It has proved diﬃ  cult to 
[…] show that any of the labour market rigidity vari-
ables work.”
They also doubt that labour market institutions interacting 
with macroeconomic shocks explain unemployment satisfac-
torily, as is argued by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
The impact of labour market institutions on unemployment 
is an ongoing debate. In this article I discuss the possibility 
that one reason why it is hard to detect a robust impact of 
labour market institutions on unemployment is that there 
exist several labour market regimes in OECD countries. Ex-
ternal labour market fl exibility might not play the same role 
in determining unemployment in corporatist labour market 
regimes as in non-corporatist ones. 
* Th is article expands on the literature survey in: Sturn, S. (2013). Are corporatist labour markets diff erent? Labour market regimes and 
unemployment in OECD countries. International Labour Review, 152(2), 237–254.
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2.  Is there evidence for diﬀ erent 
labour market regimes?
As is illustrated in the introduction, it is often stated that the 
“standard” linear estimates of reduced-form unemployment 
equations, where institutions explain the development of un-
employment, are not robust or may even be misspecifi ed. In 
response, one focus of recent research has been on institu-
tional complementarities. Institutions are complementary if 
the presence of one increases or decreases the returns from 
the other (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 17). This helps to explain 
why countries with very diverse institutional sett ings and 
diﬀ erent degrees of labour market fl exibility have equally 
low unemployment rates.
Several studies tested for institutional complementarities. 
Some of them focused on the wage-bargaining system, as it 
seems to have important empirical eﬀ ects on labour markets. 
For example, Elmeskov et al. (1998) test for complementari-
ties between some labour market institutions and/or bargain-
ing centralisation/coordination in OECD countries. They fi nd 
evidence that diﬀ erent collective bargaining arrangements 
infl uence the way in which employment protection legisla-
tion and the tax wedge aﬀ ect unemployment. Belot and van 
Ours (2004) fi nd that unemployment benefi t replacement 
rates and tax rates reinforce each other, and that in countries 
where bargaining mainly takes place at the fi rm level, em-
ployment protection legislation has a strong negative eﬀ ect 
on unemployment, while union density has a positive one. 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) explain unemployment in OECD 
countries econometrically with a new labour market institu-
tions data set, compiled by the OECD. They estimate stan-
dard reduced-form unemployment equations, but also iden-
tify institutional complementarities. Although they do not 
pay explicit att ention to these results, they fi nd that the im-
pact of the tax wedge on unemployment is lower in countries 
with decentralised wage bargaining, and that employment 
protection legislation aﬀ ects unemployment only in coun-
tries with decentralised wage bargaining.
While much of the empirical literature focuses on interac-
tions between labour market institutions, the OECD (2006: 
183-205) follows a diﬀ erent approach. In this study 24 OECD 
countries are grouped into clusters according to their in-
stitutional labour market sett ings in the early 2000’s (see 
Table 1). Principal components analysis is used to identify 
them. When analysing the labour market performance of 
these clusters, the fi ndings are that the “North and Central 
European countries” are as successful in achieving low un-
employment as the “English-speaking countries”, although 
these two clusters exhibit strong institutional diﬀ erences in 
nearly every selected area. For example, the generosity of the 
unemployment benefi t system and union bargaining cover-
age are highest in the North and Central European countries, 
and lowest in the English-speaking countries. The North and 
Central European countries also have a higher tax wedge, 
higher union density, stricter employment protection legisla-
tion, and spend most on active labour market policy. Accord-
ing to the OECD (2006: 192), “[t]his suggests that there is not 
a single road for achieving good employment performance.”1
1  As is shown in Table 1, the “North and Central European coun-
tries” are also most successful in keeping income inequality low.
The approach of OECD (2006) has enriched the debate, since 
it acknowledges that labour market institutions are part of a 
broader institutional model and that diﬀ erent labour market 
regimes exist. This fi nding is also confi rmed in Sturn (2013). 
For a set of 20 OECD countries in the period 1985-2008, evi-
dence of diﬀ ering impacts of labour market institutions on 
unemployment in corporatist labour markets is presented. 
Strict employment protection legislation is found to go along 
with lower unemployment in corporatist labour markets.
3.  Why does the impact of 
institutions on unemployment 
depend on the labour market regime?
As is argued in the literature on “varieties of capitalism”, in-
stitutions are elements of complex socio-economic arrange-
ments and strategic interactions, and fulfi l diﬀ erent functions 
within distinct economic regimes (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Amable, 2003; Freeman, 1998, 2000). Indeed, there is growing 
evidence that important variables are omitt ed in the standard 
approach of explaining unemployment only with standard 
labour market institutions, and that these institutions do not 
play the same role in all institutional regimes.
First, Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) argue that if employment and 
income protection is high, as is particularly the case in corpo-
ratist countries, workers are more willing to invest in fi rm- 
and industry-specifi c skills (see also Harcourt and Wood, 
2007). In turn this makes it more att ractive for fi rms to invest 
in skill-intensive production techniques. Because of the re-
sulting international institutional comparative advantage of 
these fi rms in a particular skill-intensive production niche, 
strict employment protection legislation and high unemploy-
ment benefi ts are favourable for employees and employers. 
This is in turn refl ected by good labour relations.
Supportive cross-country evidence is presented by Bassanini 
and Ernst (2002a and 2002b). They fi nd that the stricter is em-
ployment protection in countries with a coordinated system 
of industrial relations, the greater is their technological com-
parative advantage in “routinised” industry-specifi c inno-
vation regimes, where fi rms undertake incremental innova-
tions along an existing technological trajectory (e.g. electronic 
components, aircrafts and spacecrafts). The reverse eﬀ ect of 
employment protection legislation is found for decentral-
ised countries. They argue that industries characterised by a 
routinised innovation regime have a strong incentive to use 
the fi rm’s internal labour market. “[S]tringent employment 
protection and coordinated systems of industrial relations, 
by aligning workers’ and fi rms’ objectives, enhancing the ac-
cumulation of fi rm-specifi c competencies and encouraging 
fi rm-sponsored training, may allow fi rms to fully exploit the 
potential of the internal labour market.” (2002a, p. 419)
Related arguments are put forward by Blanchard and Phil-
lipon (2004) and Feldmann (2006). They fi nd that good la-
bour relations (which are highly correlated with corporatism; 
see Table 2) decrease unemployment. Good labour relations 
increase the probability of concessions of workers to over-
come adverse economic shocks. They further decrease labour 
turnover, making employers more willing to invest in hu-
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Tab. 1. Diff erent regimes of the labour market according to OECD (2006)a
Source: OECD 2006: 191, own presentation
a  Th is country classifi cation is derived from a Principal Component Analysis, a simple statistical technique which helps 
to identify existing combinations of policy settings and to highlight similarities and diff erences across countries. How-
ever, some countries are barely representative of the group of countries to which they belong, being close to the frontier 
between two regimes of labour market functioning. Th is is for instance the case for Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Japan, Korea, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.
b  Th is group of countries includes Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States.
c  Th is group of countries includes Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
d  Th is group of countries includes Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
e  Th is group of countries includes the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic.
f  Average unemployment benefi t replacement rate across two income situations (100% and 67% of APW earnings), 
three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work), over a fi ve-year period of unemployment.
g  ALMP expenditures per unemployed workers as a percentage of GDP per capita.
h  Tax wedge between the labour cost to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee for a 
couple with a dependent spouse and two children earning 100% of APW earnings.
i  Total expenditures on active and passive measures as a percentage of GDP.
j  ALMP expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
k  Gini index for total population. Not available for Korea and the Slovak Republic.
l  Calculated as the proportion of the population with income below 50% of the current median income. Not available 
for Korea and the Slovak Republic.
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man capital of their employees, and employees become more 
motivated to acquire fi rm-specifi c skills and to make propos-
als for an improvement of production techniques and work 
organisation. This results in higher productivity and lower 
unemployment. According to these arguments, employment 
and income protecting institutions, good labour relations, 
skill investments of workers and low unemployment are in-
terrelated in a systematic way in corporatist countries.
Second, the standard-approach focuses only on indicators for 
external labour market fl exibility. But, especially in corporat-
ist countries, internal fl exibility might be as important to ad-
just production capacities and costs to actual demand. While 
with external fl exibility this adjustment is achieved via hir-
ings or dismissals, with internal fl exibility the same outcome 
is obtained through variations in regular working hours 
and overtime work, working time accounts, and (publicly 
funded) short-time work schemes.2 Eichhorst et al. (2010) 
construct a quantitative indicator for 16 European countries 
in 2003, which includes measures of internal fl exibility. They 
also consider information on functional fl exibility, which re-
quires a skilled and fl exible labour force adapting to struc-
tural change (external functional fl exibility), or a fl exible 
organisation of the production process (internal functional 
fl exibility). When internal fl exibility is included in their sum-
mary fl exibility indicator, especially for countries typically 
described as corporatist – like Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (see Table 2) – much 
greater overall fl exibility is evident. Denmark, Finland, and 
Germany emerge as even more fl exible than the UK. This 
suggests that important indicators for fl exibility are omitt ed 
when focusing only on standard labour market institutions.
What’s more, the results of Eichhorst et al. (2010) confi rm 
that there exist diﬀ erent labour market regimes. The so called 
“liberal market economies” (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or Anglo 
Saxon countries are on average characterised by high exter-
nal fl exibility, but low internal fl exibility. The corporatist or 
“coordinated market economies” (Hall and Soskice, 2001) in 
Northern and Central Europe show a high degree of internal 
fl exibility and a low degree of external fl exibility. And some 
southern European countries are below average in external 
and internal fl exibility measures. This helps to explain why 
some countries with very “rigid” labour markets – when fo-
cusing on indicators of external fl exibility – are very success-
ful in achieving low unemployment.
And third, the standard-approach assumes that wage-mod-
eration, higher work eﬀ ort and a smoother adjustment of la-
bour supply and demand is achieved through pressure on 
unions and unemployed via the deregulation of labour mar-
kets. While this may be a reasonable approximation for the 
functioning of labour markets in liberal market economies, it 
is a very crude description of the process of wage bargaining 
and labour market policy in corporatist economies. In these 
countries, employer associations, unions and (perhaps even) 
the government negotiate wages, working time and (perhaps 
even) labour market and social policy (see Aidt and Tzan-
2  The German experience in the “Great Recession”, where GDP 
dropped by more than 6% from peak in 2008 to trough in 2009, 
and employment remained nearly constant, while working 
hours were drastically reduced, illustrates the importance of 
internal fl exibility in determining unemployment (Möller, 2010; 
Herzog-Stein et al., 2013).
natos, 2002, for a survey of the literature on corporatism). So-
cial partners consider the situation of the whole economy in 
decision-making, and may respond to rising unemployment 
from macroeconomic shocks with social pacts and other ar-
rangements to fi ght unemployment (e.g. Visser, 1998; Bacca-
ro, 2003). Therefore, external labour market fl exibility plays a 
less relevant role in achieving low unemployment in a corpo-
ratist environment.
In the literature on (neo-)corporatism and social partnership, 
it is further argued that trade unions are compensated by the 
government for wage moderation and social peace (Headey, 
1970; Schmitt er, 1977; Lange and Garrett , 1985; Alvarez et al., 
1991). Although this tendency has probably decreased since 
the 1970s (Hassel, 2003), it still plays a certain role (Hicks 
and Kenworthy, 1998; Hemerijck et al., 2000; Baccaro, 2003; 
Brandl and Traxler, 2005). This means that there is some 
trade-oﬀ  between internal and external fl exibility in corporat-
ist countries. Also the OECD (2010: 63) points out that there is 
evidence for a cross-country trade-oﬀ  between low employ-
ment protection regulation and high internal fl exibility.
To sum up, internal fl exibility plays an important role in 
adapting labour demand to labour supply especially in cor-
poratist countries. In wage bargaining processes in corporat-
ist countries (with good relations between the social partners 
and the state) workers’ representatives accept increasing in-
ternal wage and working time fl exibility, but receive some 
compensation in the form of job and income security. There 
exists a (certain) trade-oﬀ  between internal and external fl ex-
ibility as a result of the political economy of wage bargaining 
in corporatist countries. These mechanisms are amplifi ed by 
the impact of good labour relations and employment and in-
come protection on the skill-investments and productivity of 
workers. Therefore, external labour market fl exibility, espe-
cially in the form of employment protection legislation and 
unemployment benefi ts, shows a diﬀ erent impact on unem-
ployment in corporatist labour market regimes. 
4.  Concluding remarks and policy 
implications
In this article it is argued that labour markets function dif-
ferently in corporatist labour market regimes than in non-
corporatist regimes for mainly two reasons. Firstly, internal 
fl exibility is much higher in corporatist labour markets than 
in non-corporatist. Therefore, overall fl exibility is especially 
underestimated in corporatist labour markets when focusing 
only on standard labour market institutions for external fl exi-
bility. Secondly, there is evidence for a trade-oﬀ  between high 
internal and external fl exibility, due to the political economy 
of wage bargaining processes. Therefore, labour market in-
stitutions play a diﬀ erent role in corporatist regimes than in 
non-corporatist ones.
This casts doubts on the view proposed by OECD (1994), 
IMF (2003), and others, that labour market deregulation is a 
universal panacea against high unemployment. There is clear 
evidence in the literature for diﬀ erent labour market regimes, 
which are able to achieve low unemployment through diﬀ er-
ent channels. Following the deregulation paradigm in corpo-
ratist economies may reduce the quality of labour relations 
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and the willingness of employees to cooperate in aspects of 
internal fl exibility, as well as the necessity for social partners 
to deal with these issues. Therefore external fl exibility in-
creases, but this may be outweighed by a reduction in inter-
nal fl exibility, with unclear or negative net-eﬀ ects on unem-
ployment. Partial deregulation in a corporatist country can 
push its labour market into the intermediate position of hav-
ing relatively low external and internal fl exibility. Therefore, 
taking account of a country’s specifi c labour market regime 
and institutional complementarities is crucial for successful 
employment policy.
This review is also helpful for answering why in the Great 
Recession “[u]nemployment generally rose by less in those 
countries which had strict employment protection legisla-
tion, as it did in those countries with relatively high collec-
tive-bargaining coverage” (Amable and Mayhew, 2011: 207), 
even after correcting for the severity of the drop in output 
and the strength of macro policy responses. High internal 
fl exibility in these countries allowed fi rms to hoard labour 
during the recession, which helped to distribute low labour 
demand more equally.
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